The experiments were conducted in 6 periods of 30 seconds each. At the beginning of a period, buyers were given the right to buy one or more units, and they were informed of the redemption values of each unit. Sellers were given the right to sell one or more units, and informed of the cost of production for each unit.
Three simplifying assumptions were made about the market structure of the double auction. 1) Each bid, ask, and transaction was valid for a single unit (units were traded one at a time). 2) A transaction cancelled unaccepted bids and/or offers. 3) When a bid and ask crossed, the transaction price was the earlier of the two.
(Gode and Sunder, 1993)
The Gode-Sunder ZIC Environment
The Gode-Sunder experiments were carried out with 12 traders, equally divided into buyers and sellers. There were two kinds of traders, tested separately in homogeneous populations: ZI-C and ZI-U, constrained and unconstrained, respectively.